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RECENT CASE

RECENT CASE
BANKS AND BANKING -

FORGED CHECKS -

DEPOSITOR'S DUTY

TO DRAWEE UPON DISCOVERY OF FORGERY -

BURDEN OF PROOF.

In a recent decision, Johnson v. First National Bank of Beaver Falls,' a

sharply divided Pennsylvania Supreme Court veered away from all precedent
in the law of negotiable instruments, particularly in the concepts of estoppel and
notice as they formerly were applied to the depositor-bank relation.
Fundamentally, the fact situation is common enough-the depositor goes
on an extended vacation: leaving behind a large bank account, his check book,
and a step-son with a previously unmanifested penchant for forgery. For an understanding of the decision, however, and why its influence on Pennsylvania law
is likely to be greater than the court admits, an outline of the chronology of the
case is necessary.
On July 23, 1948 (the year in which all the following dates fall), the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Johnson, departed for Florida. Beginning that day and
continuing until September 18, Jackson, son of Mrs. Johnson and Mr. Johnson's
step-son, forged seventeen checks on their joint account. Upon his return September 20, Mr. Johnson visited the bank and found his balance to be only $1,088 instead
of an anticipated $3,278.2 Apparently Johnson suspected what had happened because he immediately confronted Jackson, who admitted the forgeries. During the
next several days Jackson, with Johnson's consent, tried to raise the money, but
he failed. Thereupon, on September 28, the plaintiff and the forger entered
into a written agreement which provided that Jackson would pay back the money
in bi-monthly installments. Although the fact is only indirectly alluded to in the
case, it appears that Jackson committed two more forgeries, one on October 1,
and another October 4, even though he had paid back a small amount under the
agreement. Sometime around the middle of October, Johnson again visited the
bank and found that there was no remaining balance in his account. Then he went
to the cashier and said, "Mr. Luce, there's $3,120 of my money gone, for what
reason I don't know." Finally, when it became evident that Jackson would be unable to return the money, Johnson had him arrested. Jackson pleaded guilty, and
on December 8 was sentenced to a term in the penitentiary. Later Johnson formally
demanded that the bank credit to his account the amount that had been paid out
on the forged checks. The bank refused, and Johnson brought this suit.
1 367 Pa. 459, 81 A.2d 95 (1951).
2 Upon receiving this information, which should have been, as Mr. Justice Stern says in the dissent,
a "staggering revelation," Johnson said to the clerk: "I know I had more money than that'--hardly
a vigorous protestation. Later he claims to have added: "I say the money is misappropriated." At

any rate, he did not inform the bank of the discrepancy in a manner which could be construed
as notice.
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At trial, the jury found for the plaintiff in thle amount of $2,770, which represented fifteen of the seventeen forgeries, or the aggregate of the checks drawn
b'efore September 20. It excepted from the verdict the two checks drawn after
September 20, probably because Johnson, aware by this time of Jackson's derelictions, did nothing to forewarn the bank. The bank then moved for and was granted
a judgment n.o.v. on the ground that since the plaintiff had failed to give prompt
notice of the forgeries, he was precluded from using them as a .basis for action.
On appeal, a majority3 of the Supreme Court reversed this decision and entered
judgment for plaintiffs on the verdict. Mr. Justice Horace Stern, followed by
Mr. Justice Chidsey and Mr. Justice Bell, strongly dissented, holding that judgment
for the defendant-bank should have been affirmed.
Since the majority decision is made up of various premises which sometimes
lack the benefit of logical connection, a brief summary of its rationale is herewith
presented: Section 23 of Negotiable Instruments Law 4 provides that "When
a signature is forged . . . it is wholly inoperative, and no right . . . to enforce

payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through or under
such signature, unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right
is precluded from setting up the forgery.

.

." Then the court construes "preclude"

as equivalent to "estoppel," basing its construction on some authority5 and the
vague but precedentally ubiquitous reason that of two innocents, the one who made
the injury possible must bear the loss. Since negligence is a ground of estoppel, and
a depositor's failure to promptly notify the bank of a forgery is a type of negligence,
a depositor may be estopped from recovering from a bank which has paid out on
forgeries, within the meaning of the NIL. The court then dilutes the requirement
of "prompt notice" to "timely notice," apparently on the basis that "prompt"
is too inflexible a word and that "timely" is more apt because it ostensibly allows
room for a consideration of the circumstances of each case. Although precedent
holds that the question of whether or not prompt notice has been given is one of
law, the-majority holds that whether timely notice has been given is a question
of fact, and, therefore, the facts of the Johnson case should have been submitted
to the jury.
In deciding the Johnson case neither the majority nor the dissent relies on
any particular theory, although there are several which mitigate the bank's absolute
contractual duty to pay only on the depositor's order, thereby giving the bank
some measure of protection. Suffice to say that under the so-called "contract
theory" the depositor is considered to have breached his contractual duty to the
bank when h'e negligently fails to discover forgeries among his cancelled checks,
or if, after discovering them, he fails to notify the bank, and the depositor is
liable to the extent that his breach has injured the bank. The "estoppel theory"
s Drew, C. J., Stearne, Jones and Ladner, JJ.
4 Act of May 16, 1901, P. L. 194, 56 P. S. § 28.
5 Commonwealth v. Globe Indemnity Company, 323 Pa. 261, 185 A. 796 (1936).
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also presupposes the contract between the bank and the depositor, but under that
theory his failure to notify is considered a representation to the bank that the
checks are genuine. If the bank pays out in reliance on that representation and is
thereby injured, the depositor will not be allowed to show that the checks were
forged, which again precludes his recovery. This distinction has not been stressed
by the Pennsylvania courts, and under the facts of the Johnson case, the applica6
tion of either theory would end in the same result.
In regard to notice, the dissent succinctly states the prevailing Pennsylvania
rule.
...when a depositor has knowledge that a bank has improperly paid out
moneys in his account on forged checks, it is his duty-and the sine
qua non cf his right of recovery against the bank-to give the bank
prompt notice of the forgeries [emphasis, the court's]."7
The majoiity opinion also recognizes this principle as it is applied in
McNeely Company v. Bank of North America,8 which is the leading Pennsylvania
case in the field, but, as a method for breaking down this well-established rule,
adds that what constitutes prompt notice "varies with the circumstances of each
case.
As authority for the proposition that the Johnson case is one in which the
factual situation warrants a decision on its individual merits and circumstances,
even though the plaintiff deliberately concealed the forgeries rather than endeavored to give the bank notice, the majority cites two cases. The first is Commonwealth
v. Globe Indemnity Company,9 where a state employee forged checks to fictitious
payees, drawn on the Commonwealth's account, later intercepting them and forging the indorsements. The fraud, which had continued for two years, was discovered November 6, 1929, and in the agreement of facts it was stipulated that
the Commonwealth "took steps to gather together all' the checks involved here,
a considerable task involving thousandsupon thousandsof checks [emphasis mine],
and securing only those checks which are the subject of this transaction." Nevertheless, the Commonwealth delivered the first batch of forgeries to the bank on
November 23, 1929-a little over two weeks between discovery and actual notification. Under the facts set forth this was obviously as prompt notice as possible,
and the case is Pot even roughly analagous to the Johnson case, where the plaintiff
never attempted to notify the bank.
6 For a comprehensive discussion of these theories, see BRrrrON ON BILLS AND NOTES, Sec. 132
(Hornbook series, 1943).
'7 There is a plethora of authority for the rule: Peoples City Bank v. John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Co., 353 Pa. 123, 44 A.2d 514 (1945); Showers v. Merchants National Bank, 293 Pa.
241, 142 A. 275 (1928); Marks v. Anchor Savings Bank, 252 Pa. 304, 97 A. 399 (1916); Connors
v. Old Forge Discount and Deposit Bank, 245 Pa. 97, 91 A. 210 (1914). For other citations, see the
Johnson case, n. 1, dissent, at p. 470.
8 221 Pa. 588, 70 A. 891 (1908).
9 n. 5.
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The manner in which the court construes another case dealing with notice
bears quoting.
"[In Iron City National Bank v. Fort Pitt National Bank],1O Mr.
Justice MITCHELL had said that, short of an equitable estoppel
[emphasis, the court's] in favor of a bank which has paid out the
proceeds of a check bearing a forged endorsement, 'the date of notice is
not material.' With reference to that statement, it was observed in the
McNeely case that 'This must be read with reference to the facts in that
case.' And, of course, that is so in any case."
In the Iron City case, however, the depositor in question was not the person
from whose account the bank had paid a forged check, but a depositor to whom
the bank had made payment on a forgery which the depositor himself had presented
to his bank. Under old Pennsylvania law which arose under the doctrine of Price
v. Neal,1 acceptance or payment of a check by the drawee was an absolute admission
of the drawer's signature, and once the payment was made, or even a notation entered in the depositor's book as cash, the bank was held liable to the depositor for that
amount.
The court in the Iron City case is busy construing the Act of 1849,12 which
was intended to overcome the rule of Price v. Neal and allow the bank to recover
from a depositor to whom it had credited a forged check, if it had exercised due
care and had given the depositor prompt notice of the forgery. In its decision the
court says, "The act of paying was held to be conclusive estoppel. . ." This is the
only mention of estoppel in the case and bears no relation to equitable estoppel as
it is applied to the depositor-bank situation in the Johnson case.
But this is not to say that the Iron City case does not take cognizance of circumstances of the case:
ive
noiceromptly according
"All that he need do in any case is to give notice p
to the circumstances and the usage of the busiess, an unless the position
of the party receiving the money has been altered for the worse
in the meaiitime, it would seem that the date of notice is not material. But on the other hand, the statute does not dispense with
the necessity of care and diligence on the part of the payer, nor
exempt him from the consequences of his own negligence, if thereby
loss would accrue to the other party."
Seen in its context, the phrase "the date of notice is not material" also loses
its significance when applied to the depositor-bank situation sub judice. The
McNeely case, which is similar to the Johnson case, recognized this feature when
it said,
"This must be read with reference to the facts in [the Iron City case].
As to those in the present one it is not applicable. There, the Fort
10 159 Pa. 46, 28 A. 195 (1893).
11 3 Burr. 1354 (1762).
12 Act of 1849, P. L. 426, 56 P. S. 7 29.
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Pitt National Bank, the defendant which received the money on the forged
check, hadsaid it out on the check of its depositor, to whose credit it had
been placed, and all that we meant to say was, that if the bank had not
paid out, and could still have protected itself by withholding it, the date
of notice of the forgery would not have been material."
The foregoing has been rather fully developed, chiefly because the majority
opinion of the present Supreme Court offers "circumstances of the case" as its
only basis for changing the requisite of "prompt notice" to "timely notice," and
the discussion has attempted to point out that the court, either by misconstruction
or partial quotation of precedent, actually provides no basis for the change. How
the majority continues in this respect is an interesting example of judicial rationalization.
Since it was decided in 1908, the case of McNeely Company v. Bank of North
America 8 has been regarded by the Pennsylvania courts as the apotheosis of what
constitutes legally adequate notice in this Commonwealth. The case is important
not only because it strongly reiterates what prompt notice is, but also because it
codifies prior case rulings as to what prompt notice means procedurally and substantively, once it is found to exist in a given case.
The facts of the McNeely case are typical of many forgery cases. A trusted
employee of the McNeely Company, which was a depositor of the defendant bank,
used such an ingenious system of forgery, including alteration of the company's
books, that he was not discovered until January 1, 1904, after he had been operating for six years. The company immediately instituted an investigation and within
two or three weeks knew definitely that some ninety forgeries had been committed.
Although fourteen directors' meetings were held in the interim, where the matter
certainly must have been discussed, notice was not given to the bank until April
14, 1904-nearly three months later.
The referee specifically found that neither the bank nor the depositor was
negligent up to January 1, 1904, and under the contract theory it could be found
that the company's duty to notify the bank did not arise until the first forgery
was discovered-that it, at no time within the six year period would a reasonable
man have discovered the forgeries in any given group of cancelled checks. Therefore, no estoppel could arise which would prevent the company from recovering,
and any denial of recovery would have to be based on the company's breach of
contractual duty when it first became aware of the ninety forgeries, considering
all of them as a single group, even though that group consisted of many separate
batches of cancelled checks. If there were an appreciable lag between the discovery
of the forgeries and the notification, then a finding that the depositor's failure
to promptly notify the bank precluded him from recovery would be theoretically
justifiable under the contract theory.
18 n. 8.
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And the court in the McNeely case so finds; it discusses the contractual relation between the bank and the depositor, but, as to the bank's absolute liability
for mispayment of funds adds;
"Whenever the depositor knowingly withholds from [the bank]
knowledge without which it cannot so proceed in an effort to protect
itself, he ought to be regarded, when he comes to enforce alleged rights
against it, as having withheld from it a substantial right, without regard
to what might or might not have resulted from a prompt exercise of that
right."
Since the depositor had delayed for three months after it had knowledge
of the forgeries, the court held it could not recover for any of the forged checks.
The majority opinion of the present Supreme Court reflects a complete misunderstanding of the facts, issue and rule of the McNeely case:
"What was said in the McNeely case with respect to a depositor's duty
to give his bank prompt [emphasis, the court's] notice that it had paid
and charged to his account a forged check was, in reality, superfluous to
the decision in that case . . . There, the admitted facts and undisputed

documentary proofs conclusively showed such a negligent course or conduct on the part of the depositor with respect to its regularly returned
checks over a period of six years that the depositor's recovery for the
bank's payment of forged checks during that long time was precluded
as a matter of law. No substantial question as to the promptness of any
notice was involved. There was no room for doubt that the bank had
not been promptly notified of the forgeries."
So much for misconstruction of the facts. Keep in mind that in the case
sub judice Johnson, the plaintiff, never notified the bank of any forgeries, but
deliberately concealed them to protect his wayward step-son. The court continues:
"The question which the plaintiff's claim actually posed in the McNeely
case was whether the bank was not liable for the payment of forged
chLcks regardless of the lack of prompt notice of the forgeries. That
question was ruled adversely to the plaintiff on a principle deduced from
United Security Life Insurance and Trust Company v. Central National
Bank 14. . .
The principle to which the court refers is the presumption of injury to the
bank which arises when it is shown that prompt notice was not given by the depositor. 15 Note, however, that the United Security Life Insurance and Trust caske
is even stronger authority for the rule that the depositor cannot recover without
giving prompt notice than is the McNeely case. How the majority opinion attempts
to distinguish the case is summed up by the dissent:
"The majority opinion says that the United Security Life Insurance &
Trust Co. case was decided three years before Pennsylvania's adoption
14 185 Pa. 586, 40 A. 97 (1898).
5 This presumption is fully considered later.
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of the Negotiable Instruments Law, the intimation being that in some
way or for some reason the Negotiable Instruments Law outmoded it. This
attack on that case as authority for the proposition that it does not avail
the depositor to show that even if notice had been given promptly the bank
would not have been better off, ignores the fact that the United Security
Life Insurance & Trust Co. case has been followed in... many decisions
.. .all of which have been subsequent in time to the adoption of the
Negotiable Instruments Law." (Emphasis, the court's)
The court in the McNeely case considers three months delay too long to be
consistent with prompt notice, and, by 1915, "prompt" is regarded as the standard.
16
In speaking of a two months delay in notification the court, in Lesley v. Ewing,
says:
s ...we think, charged with such knowledge, he cannot escape the rule
of law, settled in our State, that he must act promptly in notifying the
bank, if he intends to demand payment of the amount paid on the forged
indorsement."
That the courts followed the requirement of prompt notice as a concept, and
not through mere judicial devotion to a word, is shown by a comment in Marks v.
Anchor Savings Bank,' 7 decided shortly after the Lesley case.
"While, perhaps, in the last case the use of the word 'prompt' might have
supra,
been more suitable than 'immediate,' yet in McNeely Co. v. B
at p. 594, we said it was the duty of the depositor to send notice of a
forgery to the bank 'at once.'"
At this point it is necessary, for the purposes of exposition, to impose an arbitrary separation between "piompt notice" as accepted by the Pennsylvania courts
before the Johnson case and the new concept of "timely notice" as developed by
the present Supreme Court. What effect a finding of prompt notice, or lack of
it,had under previous law must be considered before the significance of the
Johnson case can be fully appreciated.
Although the weight of authority requires the bank to prove injury,' 8 under
many jurisdictions, including the United States Supreme Court and the courts
of Pennsylvania, it is held that a presumption of injury to the bank arises once there
is a finding that the depositor did not give prompt notice. This rule is widely
cited as it is stated in the United Security Life Insurance and Trust Company cas'e.
"The law assumes, and does not find it necessary to conduct an inquiry
to verify the assumption, that had the notice been given romptly, the
[bank] m;ght have taken steps to protect itself as against Se [forger]."

16 248 Pa. 135, 93 A. 875 (1915).
17 252 Pa. 304, 97 A. 399 (1916).
18 7 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 369, Banks, § 14.
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Since its affirmance in the McNeely case this rule unquestionably has been
Pennsylvania law. Why the presumption arises is well explained in Leather Manufacturers' Bank v. Morgan.19
"It is not necessary that it should be made to appear, by evidence, that
benefit would certainly have accrued to the bank from an attempt to secure paymnt from the criminal ...As the right to seek and compel

restoration and payment from the person committing the forgeries was,
in itself, a valuable one, it is sufficient if it appears that the bank, by
reason of the negligence of the depositor, was prevented from promptly,
and it may be, effectively exercising it."
In Pennsylvania, the courts have based this presumption mainly on three
principles, and the McNeely case sums up the first one.
"The issue is forgery, and ought not to be complicated with another,
and a speculative one, as to whether anything might have been recovered
from the forger, if prompt notice had been given to the bank of the
forgery." (Emphasis supplied)
The second principle upon which the presumption rests is based on an analogy
to the law in another similar negotiable instruments situation-where a holder
attempts to recover payment from an indorser to whom the holder has not given
prompt notice of non-payment. When the indorser raises his defense of improper
notice, the holder will not be permitted to claim that, even if he had given prompt
notice, the indorser could not have recovered from the maker or a prior indorser
because they were insolvent. The holder (or the depositor) should comply with
the obligation of prompt notice, to give the indorser (or the bank) an opportunity
to recoup its loss. With respect to holders of notes, at any rate, this rather puerile
20
argument was discussed and dismissed as early 'as 1815 in Pennsylvania.
The third principle, and probably the best of the three, is that the courts seem
have
felt that it is simply too difficult for the bank to show that, if it had been
to
notified,' "it might have been better able to protect itself by obtaining reimburse21
ment from the forger or his relatives or friends."
What effe.-t has the Johnson case on this presumption? The majority opinion
says that:
"... 'timely' rather than 'prompt' more correctly defines the character of

notice which a depositor is required to give his bank of a forged check
charged to his account. In the nature of things, there can be no arbitrary
standard as to the length of time within which a depositor, after discovering that his bank has charged a forged check to his account, must give the
bank notice thereof in order that he may not be precluded from setting up
the forgery."
19 Leather Manufacturers' Bank v. Morgan, 117 U. S. 96, 6 S. Ct. 657, 29 L. Ed. 811 (1886).
20

Barton v. Baker, 1 S. & R. 334 (1815).

21

Johnson Case, n. 1, dissent, at p. 471.
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Naturally, it is always true that notice can be only as prompt or timely as the
circumstances permit. A depositor cannot be expected to discover forgeries if he
has not yet received his cancelled checks; nor could he be expected to extend knowledge of them to the bank if he has no means of communication at hand. But the
court does not contemplate what effect this substitution of terms has on the presumption which formerly arose when lack of prompt notice was shown. Rather,
the decision indicates that previous cases have meant "timely" all along. If this
is true, is it possible that the presumption could arise if the depositor failed to
give "timely notice?"
Under precedent, if prompt notice was not given, the presumption of injury
arose. Our new standard, timely notice, might be defined as a failure to notify the
bank in time to orevent injury, taking in consideration the circumstances of the case.
However, once the time has passed within which prompt notice could have been
given, and therefore the presumption arises, no notice given thereafter could be
timely. Syllogistically, it may be expressed this way: A notice is not timely which
is not given in time to prevent injury. A bank is presumed to suffer injury if notice
is no given with reasonable promptness. Therefore, notice which is not prompt
is not timely.
Notwithstanding the majority's contention that timely and prompt are closely
related, it is obvious that the only method by which the two premises can be equated
is to remove the presumption of prejudice.
The remuval of this presumption is the most important aspect of the case and
the focal point which must be kept in mind when considering its evidential ramifications. Before reaching them, however, it is important to ascertain whether
removal of the presumption is justified. In this connection, it should be noted that
the majority opinion does not supply any reasons for abandoning the presumption,
nor, for that matter, does it take cognizance of the presumption's existence, except
where it attempts to distirguish the United Security Life Insurance and Trust Co.
case from the Johnson case, which is backhanded recognition at best. In any event,
since the presumption of injury has served a long and useful life in Pennsylvania,
it does not seem. fitting that it should be buried without some kind of judicial obituary. Notwithstanding this paucity of explanation, however, it now appears that
Pennsylvania follows the weight of authority in not raising a presumption of injury
when lack of prompt notice is found. Now, after proving that the depositor breached his contractual duty, the bank must show that events occurred by which it suffered further injury, such as the depositor's death or his leaving the jurisdiction.
Two other points are developed in the majority opinion which seem to change
the rules of evidence in cases of this type. The first evidential alteration springs
directly from removal of the presumption of injury.
In Pennsylvania, when "prompt notice" was required, whether or not the
time between discovery of the forgery and notification to the bank was too long
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to constitute prompt notice was decided by the court as a matter of law, although
the question as to how much time had elapsed was one of fact for the jury. Typical
of Pennsylvania treatment of this situation is Connors V. Old Forge Discount and
Deposit Bank,2 2 where the plaintiff-depositor delayed six weeks after learning
that the payee's signature on a check which he had drawn was forged.
"[When the depositor discovered the forgery] it was his duty to then
promptly notify the bank of its mispayment ... In the face of all this it
is urged that the jury ought to have been allowed to pass upon the question
of prompt notice to the bank. To have submitted that question to them
would have been such manifest error that the trial judge may be excused
for not giving his reasons for entering the non-suit."
The determination of each case now rests on its individual circumstances,
or, as the majority opinion puts it, "The issue as to the timeliness of the notice
is one of fact to be so resolved according to the relevant and material attendant
circumstances." Since the court contents itself with this comment and does not
mention what "material and relevant attendant circumstances" would be sufficient
to raise an estoppel, it would seem that the Pennsylvania courts must now apply
a general rule to a situation where specificity is needed.
The second evidential change is not so closely related to the removal of the
presumption as the first, but its effect on the bank's burden of proof is equally
strong. Previously, the Pennsylvania courts did not place any particular stress on
the bank's burden to prove due care on its own behalf as a condition precedent to
asserting that the depositor's failure to notify estopped him from recovering.
The majority opinion in the Johnson case, however, asserts positively that the bank
must meet this burden, seizing upon rather slim evidence which tended to show
such negligence as i ground for reversing the lower court's judgment n.o.v.
The rulc that it is "the primary duty of the bank to show itself free from
negligence before the pkhintiffs could be precluded by any failure of theirs . . ."
is unquestionably in accord with the weight of authority, although it has not
been previously developed in Pennsylvania. It is not the introduction of this rule into
Pennsylvania law wb;ch is a matter of contention, therefore, but the manner in
which the court develops it is open to criticism.
Briefly, tbe majority opinion cites Peoples City Bank v. John Hancock Mutual

Life Insurance Co. 23 which ostensibly holds that the bank must prove "its lack of
knowledge in such connectior, free from any fault of its own." In this case the
defendant bank had filed a bill for discovery in equity, demanding that the plaintiff produce the exact date when it learned that its checks had been cashed on
forged indorsernents and other information which would permit the bank to show
that prompt notice had not been given. The Peoples City Bank decision does mention
22 245 Pa. 97, 91 A. 210 (1914).
28 353 Pa. 123, 44 A.2d 514 (1945).
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that the bank has the burden of proving lack of prompt notice, and the court d'ecrees
discovery to aid the bank toward that end, but it is difficult to ascertain where in
the case the prescnt Supreme Court finds authority for its contention that the bank
has a primary duty to prove due care.
Nevertheless, after establishing this rule, the court goes on to apply it to
the Johnson case. it is in this application that the majority opinion approaches
its nadir of justifiability, because the facts it seizes upon to reverse the trial court
do not seriously indicate that the bank was negligent, much less do they amount
to a question of sufficient importance for jury consideration.
Johnson, the depositor, testified that he had received his cancelled checks
in two separate envelopes on September 20, one allegedly containing genuine checks
drawn by the Johnsons prior to their trip, the other containing the forgeries. This
testimony is unsubstantiated, but the majority of the court couples it with the fact
that the forge'r, Jackson, overdrew the account when he presented his last check
for payment, and finds that whether or not these two incidences actually showed
that the bank knew, or should have known, of the forgeries is a question of fact.
Mr. Justice Stern easily disposes of this argument: it is unlikely that the bank
would have used such a "pantomimic" method of informing the depositor that
some of the canoe!led checks were forgeries, and, in the second place, the jury,
by barring Johnson from recovering for the checks cashed October 1 and October
4, "must have found that the bank had neither knowledge nor notice of the forgeries prior to its honoring those two checks." As for the second bit of evidence,
the dissent points out that later the same day the overdraft had been made, the
forger returned to cash another check, and upon being notified that he had overdrawn the account earlier that day, he made up the deficit in cash. Naturally, this
immediate satisfaction would deter the bank from making any investigation of the
depositor's records.
Considered as a whole, then, what can be said in summation of the Johnson
case? For one thing, it is unfortunate that the court chose as one of its bases of decision the technical change from "prompt" to "timely" notice. What should be the
rule which governs the speed of the depositor's response to the stimulus of discovering a forgery among his cancelled checks? A Superior Court decision Interstate
Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. First NationalBank of Lansdale,24 gives a sensible breakdown
of the rule of notice.
"The element of time with respect to the duty of a depositor appears at
two points. Itis the duty of a depositor to examine the statement and returned checks within a reasonable time, depending upon circumstances,
and if a forgery is discovered, it is his duty to promptly report the forgery
to the bank ... The default alleged here was not a delay in examining

the checks, but in reporting the forgeries. When a forgery is actually de24

139 Pa. Super. Ct. 181, 11 A.2d 537 (1939).
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tected there is ordinarily much less excuse for delay than there would be
in making the examination... Any businessman of experience, on discovering a forged check charged to him, would immediately report such
a discovery to his bank, and he is negligent if he does not promptly do so."
The Interstate Hosiery Mills decision is noteworthy because it uses the term
"businessman of experience" instead of "depositor," the latter having been used
often by the courts in a manner which implies that the depositor is merely a mechanical extension of his bank account rather than a rational human -being. In this connection it should be remembered that in the past a variety of duties have been imposed on the reasonable man. At different times and under certain circumstances,
he is expected to blow horns, ring bells, avoid invisible manholes and, in Pennsylvania, among other thiings, the trip over rough ice on the sidewalk rather than slip
on smooth ice, if he is to recover. 25 It is almost impossible to imagine this same
astute creature casually dismissing the matter as not worthy of his attention, when
he first confronts a forgery among his cancelled checks and realizes that someone
is cleaning out his bank account. The natural thing for a reasonable person to do
under these circumstances is to notify his bank, and "prompt," therefore, does not
seem to be unreasonable.
But the significance of the Johnson case does not lie in a distinction between
mere words. Whether the notice required is prompt or timely makes no difference
because, with the presumption of injury removed, a bank may prove that the depositor did not give proper notice but if it cannot prove in addition that the depositor's
negligence in not giving the notice caused the injury, it cannot defend itself against
the depositor's suit. Thus, banks have been deprived of a valuable right, and even
if a bank is unable to show any readily provable fact, such as the forger's death,
insolvency or the like, how can it be said with assurance that the bank is not
in a worse position than it would have been had it received proper notice and been
able to proceed against the forgei at once? This argument has been sufficiently
persuasive to convince the courts of Pennsylvania in the past that the presumption
sh6uld be maintained, and the majority opinion of the Supreme Court does not
seem justified in abandoning it without giving any reasons.
Considered in this light, the decision in the Johnson case represents contemporary judicial atavism in the evolution of the depositor-bank relation. Under the
requisite of "prompt notice" the courts had achieved a nice balance between the
absolute contractual duty of the bank on one hand, and the presumption of injury
favoring the bank on the other. What might happen if the bank were required to
prove the damage it had incurred was recognized long ago, when the court in the
McNeely case said of the presumption:
"A different [rule] would be putting a premium upon the laches of the
depositor, and give to a dishonest one an opportunity to help the forger
to escape."
25
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And this is precisely what the majority holding of the Supreme Court in the

Johnson case fosters. The written agreement between Johnson, the depositor, and
Jackson, the forger, may not have amounted to collusion but, without the presumption operating in its favor, the bank was forced to repay almost the full
amount of the forgeries, notwitbstanding that Johnson's breach of the contract
of deposit had made it impossible for the bank to proceed against Jackson. Note,
too, that Johnson turned Jackson over to the authorities at his leisure--only when
it became apparent that Jackson could not reimburse him, and that he never notified the bank that forgeries had been committed, claiming only that his money
was "gone" and Jeliberately concealing the forger's identity. It does not take a
prolific imagination to extend this type of factual situation to its ultimate finale,
where the depositor and forger agree beforehand that the depositor will build up
his account, arrange for the forger to withdraw it, sue the bank, and recover if he
proves that "timely" notice was given under the circumstances of the case--one of
the circumstances being, of course, that the forger will have had sufficient time
to leave the jurisdiction, to which the depositor hardly can be expected to testify.
Without the presumption of injury, and under the requisite of "timely" notice, the
contractual duty of ihe depositor to give notice is reduced to nothing, and the
bank, powerless to proceed in its own defense without receiving notice, is absolutely
contractually liable to him. From the standpoint of procedure and substance, the
decision seems to be a bad one; whether or not the lower courts will be able to
apply the new stan.iard, and whether a bank unfortunate enough to find itself litigating against a depositor will be able to bear up under it, remain to be determined.
Frederic K. Spies

